Moskva, Moscow, Russian Federation
In conditions of high volatility and digitalization of financial markets, competition between financial institutions takes on the character of strategic interaction with incomplete information. This article is devoted to the application of game theory apparatus for modeling and analyzing competitive strategies of banks, investment companies, hedge funds and other financial institutions. The paper examines how cooperative and non-cooperative game models (including zero-sum and non-zero-sum games, dynamic and repetitive games, as well as games with incomplete information) make it possible to formalize the decision-making process in areas such as pricing credit and deposit products, entering new markets, forming investment portfolios, risk management, and compliance. Regulatory requirements. Special attention is paid to models of oligopolistic competition (such as Cournot and Bertrand) adapted for the financial sector, as well as to the analysis of coordination problems and the emergence of systemic risks. The study demonstrates that game theory provides powerful tools for predicting the behavior of market participants, searching for equilibrium points (Nash, Stackelberg) and developing sustainable strategies that maximize the usefulness of the institution in the long term. The results of the work are of practical value for strategic management and risk management in financial organizations, as well as for supervisors modeling the consequences of regulatory impacts.
game theory, financial institutions, competitive strategies, modeling market behavior, Nash equilibrium, oligopoly in the financial sector, strategic interaction, systemic risk, dynamic games, cooperative and non-cooperative games, decision-making in conditions of uncertainty
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